





Modern	 therapeutics	 is	 frequently	 classified	 as	
«rational»	 in	 contrast	 to	 nonspecific	 remedies	 and	
untested,	 multi-ingredient	 prescriptions	 of	 years	
past.	 But	 strictly	 speaking,	 every	 medical	 system	 is	
«rational»,	 in	 that	 its	 conclusions	 proceed	 more	 or	
less	 logically	 from	 its	 premises.	 […]	 What	
distinguishes	modern	therapeutics	is	not	its	superior	









States	 between	 1996	 and	 2005.	 Also,	 contemporary	 prescribing	 of	 psychotropic	 drugs	 is	
characterised	by	the	rise	of	concomitant	prescribing,	which	is	the	prescribing	of	two	or	more	
psychotropic	 drugs	 from	 different	 classes	 initiated	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 by	 a	 single	 doctor	
(Bhatara	et	al.,	2004;	Safer	et	al.,	2003).	This	tendency	has	been	particularly	striking	among	
children	and	teenagers,	where	37%	to	41%	of	treatment	regimens	prescribed	to	youths	have	




Since	 these	 trends	 do	 not	 simply	 reflect	 a	 growing	 prevalence	 of	 mental	 health	
problems	 there	 have	 been	 various	 attempts	 at	 explaining	 the	 phenomenon	 (Grob	 &	
Horwitz,	2009;	Moncrieff,	2008).	Through	the	concept	of	medicalization	and	more	recently	
pharmaceuticalization,	 much	 of	 the	 literature	 addresses	 the	 major	 role	 played	 by	




drug	use	 (Wooley	&	Horwitz,	 2013;	 Grob	&	Horwitz,	 2009;	Kutchins	&	Kirk,	 1997).	 Less	
attention,	 however,	 has	 been	 paid	 to	 therapeutic	 reasoning,	 clinical	 judgment	 and	 the	
rationales	underlying	the	day-to-day	prescribing	practices	of	physicians.		
	
Actually,	 we	 can’t	 really	 say	 this	 issue	 has	 been	 completely	 ignored.	 Indeed,	
physicians’	 prescribing	 practices	 -	 particularly	 the	 problem	 of	 over-prescription	 of	
psychotropic	drugs	-	have	long	been	one	of	the	battle	horses	of	public	health,	and	a	major	










error	 (McPherson	 &	 Armstrong,	 2009;	 Bleakley	 et	 al.,	 2003;	 Brown,	 1987)?	 	 How	 do	





mental	 health	 field	 (Hacking,	 1992).	 Indeed,	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 recent	 enthusiasm	 for	 the	
sociology	of	diagnosis	(Jutel,	2011)	it	will	be	argued	that	its	study	is	inseparable	from	that	
of	therapeutics,	defined	as	a	cognitive	system	as	well	as	a	set	of	social	practices.	To	make	
sense	 of	 the	 various	 trends	 that	 shape	 clinical	 and	 therapeutic	 reasoning,	 an	 analysis	 of	




accounted	 for	by	 the	way	of	history	 than	ethnography	alone.	An	historical	perspective	of	
therapeutic	 conceptions	 and	 practices	 is	 needed	 to	 help	 decipher	 the	 complex	
sedimentation	of	ways	of	 thinking	 and	ways	of	 acting	 that	was	 progressively	 established	
through	 time.	 Foucault	 coined	 the	 term	 «genealogy»	 for	 that	 type	 of	 endeavour,	 where	
history	 serves	 the	 purpose	 of	 making	 sense	 of	 a	 contemporary	 problem	 that	 might	 be,	






it,	 has	 been	 experiencing	 a	 series	 of	 epistemological	 shifts	 between	 two	 sets	 of	 notions	
(specificity	and	universalism;	empiricism	and	rationalism)	that	reveal	tensions	in	the	way	
the	 discipline	 presents	 itself	 as	 scientifically	 legitimate	 over	 time,	 as	well	 as	 in	 between	
professional	 ambitions	 and	 day-to-day	 practice	 (Moncrieff,	 2008;	Warner,	 1986).	 In	 both	
cases,	therapeutics,	and	more	precisely	drug	treatments,	are	a	central	issue.		
	
The	 case	 for	 a	 genealogy	 of	 therapeutic	 reasoning	 in	 19th	 century	 medicine	 and	
modern	psychiatry	
	 	
Genealogy	 supposes,	 as	 Foucault	 said,	 to	 «de-naturalize»	 present	 phenomena	 by	
revealing	their	ideological	undercurrents	and	the	way	they	were	historically	set	into	place	
(Foucault,	2003).	 In	 that	regard,	 it	 is	not	«progress»	we’re	 looking	 for,	but	 the	shifting	of	
conceptions	through	time	and	the	way	it	affects	practices,	and	vice-versa.	It	is	thus	more	a	
history	 of	 continuity	 than	 change,	 in	order	 to	underline	 the	 partial	 arbitrariness	 of	what	
might	 otherwise	 appear	 true,	 just	 or	 simply	 natural,	 such	 as	 our	 contemporary	 view	 on	
sound	 medicine	 and	 adequate	 therapeutics.	 Nineteenth	 century	 medicine	 and	 modern	
psychiatry	 follow	 that	 trend,	 with	 successive	 reorganizations	 around	 the	 poles	 of	





Adopting	 a	 historical	 and	 comparative	 perspective	 between	 nineteenth	 century	




the	 nineteenth	 century,	 at	 the	 end	 of	 a	 period	 characterised	 by	 the	 excesses	 of	 heroic	
medicine	and	by	the	dominance	of	dogmatic	systems	(Bynum,	1994;	Warner,	1986).	At	that	
time,	 the	very	 status	of	 the	medical	profession,	 as	well	 as	 the	 scientific	 foundations	of	 its	
practice,	 were	 contested	 by	 several	 groups	 and	 alternative	 movements,	 such	 as	
Thomsonians	 and	 homeopaths	 through	 their	 denunciation	 of	 the	 aggressively	 used	
therapies	 such	 as	 bloodletting	 and	 mineral	 drugs	 (Rosenberg,	 1979;	 Warner,	 1986).	
Modern	 psychiatry	 as	 well	 has	 been	 under	 attack	 at	 different	 times	 throughout	 the	
twentieth	 century	 (Rosenberg,	 2007;	 Shorter,	 1997),	 namely	 since	 the	 rise	 of	 the	
antipsychiatry	movement	 in	 the	 sixties	 and	more	 recently	with	 the	 publication	of	DSM-V	
(Whooley	&	Horwitz,	2013;	Frances,	2013).		
	
	 Furthermore,	 nineteenth	 century	 general	 medicine,	 just	 like	 twentieth	 century	
psychiatry,	experienced	a	major	upheaval	 in	 its	epistemological	 foundations	as	a	result	of	
pharmacological	 discoveries.	 That	 is,	 the	 emergence	 of	 pharmacology	 in	 the	 nineteenth	
century	(Bynum	1994;	Berman,	1978)	and	the	rise	of	modern	psychopharmacology	in	the	
mid-twentieth	 century	 (Shorter,	 1997).	 In	 both	 cases,	 an	 historical	 analysis	 of	 medical	
discourse	 indicates	 an	 increasing	 interest	 for	 the	 notion	 of	 specificity	 and	 a	 quest	 for	
specific	 treatments	 targeting	 specific	 diseases	 during	 the	 decades	 preceding	 these	
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pharmacological	breakthroughs	(Moncrieff,	2008;	Pellegrino,	1979).	In	both	cases	also,	the	
finding	of	drugs	 that	would	act	on	 the	underlying	 causes	of	 the	disease	was	 the	ultimate	
ambition	(Moncrieff,	1999).	
	




epistemological	 model	 drawn	 from	 the	 natural	 sciences	 that	 aims	 to	 submit	 its	 clinical	
practice	 to	 the	 test	 of	 scientific	 evidence	 (Horwitz	 &	 Wakefield,	 2007).	 According	 to	








provide	 a	 treatment	 based	 on	 an	 idiosyncratic	 heuristics	 (Bleakley	 et	 al.,	 2003).	 The	
prominence	of	one	form	of	specificity	or	the	other	tends	to	shift	as	the	discipline	faces	crises	




My	 aim	 in	 the	 following	 pages	 is	 thus	 to	 trace,	 through	 the	 analysis	 of	 medical	
discourse,	 the	 broad	 outlines	 of	 the	 principal	 epistemological	 shifts	 and	 the	 tensions	
between	those	two	forms	of	specificity	(that	of	the	disease	and	drug	treatment,	and	that	of	
the	 patient)	 that	 delineate	 the	 history	 of	 therapeutics.	 I	 will	 also	 describe	 their	







	 According	 to	Warner	 (1986),	 the	 history	 of	 therapeutics	 and	medical	 reasoning	 in	
the	 U.S.	 during	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 was	 marked	 by	 a	 series	 of	 major,	 consecutive	
epistemological	shifts.	The	axes	constituted	by	two	sets	of	key	concepts—empiricism	and	
rationalism,	as	well	 as	universalism	and	specificity—seem	 to	provide	a	useful	 conceptual	






reasoning	 first	 underwent	 a	 shift	 from	 rationalism	 to	 empiricism	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	





	 Until	 about	 the	 1820s,	 western	 medical	 thought	 was	 still	 permeated	 by	 the	
aetiological	 theories	 of	 the	 Enlightenment.	 At	 this	 point,	 the	 notion	 of	 rationalism	 was	
identified	with	the	systems	of	medical	 thought	 that	were	most	 familiar	 to	North	American	





The	 first	 consequence	 of	 this	 conviction—that	 all	 diseases	 arose	 from	 the	 same	
pathological	mechanisms—was	a	narrowing	down	in	the	range	of	 treatments	used.	These	
consisted	 in	 a	 few	 interventions,	 that	 were	 intended	 either	 to	 excite	 or	 stimulate	 the	
organism,	 or	 to	 slow	 it	 down,	 depending	 on	 what	 was	 needed	 to	 re-establish	 the	
equilibrium	that	had	been	disrupted	by	disease.	At	the	core	of	these	systems,	as	Warner	has	
shown,	was	 the	 prospect	 of	 discovering	 a	 universal	 law	 of	 pathological	 processes	 and	 of	
their	treatment.		
	 	
	 When	applied	 to	daily	medical	practice,	 the	dogmatic	rationalism	 that	 came	out	of	
this	 medical	 epistemological	 framework	 inevitably	 reduced	 diagnosis	 and	 therapy	 to	 a	





The	 term	 empiricism,	 which	 gradually	 replaced	 dogmatic	 rationalism	 as	 the	
dominant	 paradigm	 of	 medical	 discourse	 during	 the	 same	 period,	 referred	 to	 a	 type	 of	
knowledge	that	was	firmly	grounded	in	clinical	experience,	according	to	which	knowledge	
and	experience	were	mutually	 reinforcing.	 It	 rested	on	 the	primacy	of	patient	 specificity,	
which	 implied	a	high	degree	of	 relativism	 in	 therapeutic	 strategies	and	precisely	 tailored	
treatments.		
	
However,	 as	 stated	 by	Warner,	 during	 the	 last	 decades	 of	 the	 century,	 empiricism	
would	 increasingly	 be	 associated,	 in	 medical	 rhetoric,	 with	 ignorance,	 blindness	 and	 a	
penchant	 for	 «	trial	 and	 error	»	 in	 the	 elaboration	 of	 therapeutic	 strategies.	 Rationalism	
(increasingly	 paired	 with	 the	 term	 experimental),	 would	 then	 again	 take	 on	 positive	
meanings	 by	 referring	 to	 a	 self-reflexive	medical	 practice	 that	was	 seen	 as	 cautious	 and	
judicious,	and	inspired	by	the	goal	of	standardizing	therapeutic	strategies.		
	
	 Thus,	 this	 transition	 could	 essentially	 be	 described	 as	 a	 shift	 in	 medical	 thinking	











	 Throughout	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 denunciations	 of	 rationalistic	 systems	 of	
medical	 thought	became	increasingly	 frequent,	 leading	to	an	 intense	debate	of	medicine’s	
status	 as	 a	 “real	 science.”	 Vehement	 critiques,	 arising	 from	 both	within	 and	 outside	 the	
profession,	 pointed	 to	 the	 inefficacy	 of	 its	 prevalent	 therapies.	 Physicians	 expressed	




and	 treatment	 associated	 with	 system-based	 universalism	 would	 lead	 to	 the	 gradual	
development	 of	 a	 new	 ethos	 of	 practice,	 which	 held	 that	 systematic	 rules	 could	 not	 be	










medicine.	 Those	 who	 practice	 it	 treat	 all	 cases	 of	 pneumonia	 the	 same	 way,	
using	 the	 same	 methods	 and	 the	 same	 drugs	 each	 time...	 treatment	 must	
necessarily	 vary	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 age,	 sex,	 temperament,	 constitution,	
habits,	etc.,	of	the	patient	(Lachapelle,	1878:	486).		
	
	 In	 this	 proto-bacteriological	 era,	 disease	 was	 not	 understood	 in	 the	 clinic	 as	 a	
specific	entity	but	rather,	at	least	in	part,	as	an	imbalance	in	organic	and	functional	forces.	






The	 primacy	 of	 patient-specificity	 thus	 made	 it	 almost	 inconceivable—or	 at	 least	
inadmissible	 from	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 clinical	 practice3—to	 imagine	 the	 existence	 of	 a	
disease-specific	treatment.	According	to	a	Montreal	physician:	“there	does	not	exist,	as	far	
as	 I	 know,	 among	 all	 human	disabilities,	 a	 single	 disease	 that	 can	 be	 cured	 in	 each	of	 its	
stages,	 among	 patients	 of	 all	 constitutions,	 by	 the	 same	 drug.”	 (Lamarche,	 1880:	 300).	
Because	the	unit	of	observation	and	intervention	was	not	the	disease	itself	but	the	patient,	




	 This	 paradigm	 of	 therapeutic	 complexity	 was	 clearly	 used	 to	 demonstrate	 and	
support	 a	 political	 position	 for	 claiming	 a	 monopoly	 over	 medical	 practice.	 Orthodox	




seen	 as	 being	 too	 simplistic.	 It	 was	 reminiscent	 of	 early	 nineteenth	 century	 dogmatic	
rationalism;	 it	 evoked	 a	 lack	 of	 reflection	 on	 the	 case	 at	 hand,	 and	 the	 application	 of	 a	
readymade	solution,	a	kind	of	pharmacological	 “prêt	à	porter.”	Aetiological	reasoning	was	
complex	 (consideration	 of	 the	 environment,	 etc.),	 and	 therefore	 therapeutics	 should,	
according	to	contemporary	actors,	draw	on	equally	complex	rationales.	Drugs	were	not	to	
be	 selected	 for	 their	specific	 action	on	disease,	but	 for	a	broad	 range	of	 effects,	 and	were	
used	mainly	as	symptomatic	remedies.	Empiricism,	in	the	form	of	trial-and-error,	was	to	be	







renowned	 specialists	 as	 the	 Achilles’	 heel	 of	 medicine.	 They	 bemoaned	 the	 seemingly	
infinite	 variability	 in	 practices	 and	 knowledge;	 what	 was	 considered	 as	 valid	 fluctuated	
 13 
significantly	 across	 time	 and	 place.	 Observers	 perceived	 a	 widening	 gap	 between	 the	
universalism	that	had	begun	to	characterise	other	branches	of	medical	knowledge,	and	the	
lack	of	universally	applicable	rules	in	therapeutics.	This	discrepancy	between	aetiology	and	
therapeutics,	 two	 approaches	 that	 ought	 to	 have	 been	 complementing	 each	 other,	 only	








Besides,	 as	 the	 thermometer	 and	other	 instruments	were	gradually	 being	 adopted	
into	 daily	 clinical	 practice,	 physiological	 rather	 than	 environmental	 characteristics	
increasingly	 gained	 acceptance.	 As	 Warner	 has	 shown:	 «Physicians	 were	 progressively	












modalities	 of	 use	 (e.g.,	 dosage,	 concomitant	 use	 with	 other	 substances,	 use	 specific	 to	
disease	 stage)	 (Attfield,	 1889).	 The	 effectiveness	of	medication	was	 evaluated	 not	 on	 the	





different	 from	 now.	 The	 notion	 of	 specificity,	 which	 already	 occupied	 a	 central	 place	 in	
therapeutic	 thinking,	contained	three	defining	elements:	 the	patient,	 the	stages	or	periods	
of	a	disease,	and	the	effects	a	substance	was	expected	to	have	on	the	body	or	a	particular	
group	of	organs.	The	accuracy,	effectiveness,	expertise,	and	indispensable	knowledge	of	the	
physician	 ultimately	 sprang	 from	 his	 ability	 to	 bring	 these	 three	 elements	 together	 and	
draw	on	this	association	to	elaborate	the	most	appropriate	treatment	strategy.		
	 	
	 Nonetheless,	at	the	end	of	 the	century,	 there	were	clear	 indications	that	 the	search	
for	 disease-specific	 treatments	 was	 no	 longer	 utopian	 or	 a	 manifestation	 of	 dogmatic	






disease.	 By	 valorising	 experimental	 rationalism,	 standardising	 therapeutic	 practices,	 and	
sustaining	an	active	scientific	search	for	disease-specific	therapies,	it	would	be	possible	to	




similar	 hopes	 within	 psychiatry	 during	 the	 1950s.	 Indeed,	 it	 seems	 that	 there	 is	 a	 very	
similar	 period	 of	 transition	 in	 psychiatry,	 well	 before	 the	 rise	 of	 modern	




to	 a	 dogmatic	 position	 that	 eliminated	 any	 need	 for	 reasoning,	 and	 manifested	 itself	 as	
routine	 and	 simplified	 therapeutic	 strategies.	 Specifics	 (a	 substance	 that	 would	 cure	 a	






disease	and	a	deployment	of	 therapeutic	strategies	 that	were	 just	as	complex	and	unique,	
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and	 thus	 impossible	 to	 standardise.	 The	 less	 a	 therapeutic	 strategy	 was	 replicable	 or	
standardised,	the	more	it	attested	to	the	“science”	of	the	practitioner.	
	 	
During	 the	 last	 decades	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 the	 medical	 conception	 of	
therapeutics	was	again	transformed	(and	reversed).	The	extreme	variability	in	prescribing	
strategies	 became	 taken	 as	 evidence	 that	 therapeutics,	 as	 a	 discipline,	 was	 not	 a	 “real	










these	 periods,	 and	 still	 today,	 different	 conceptions	 of	 therapeutics	 co-exist	 in	 styles	 of	
reasoning	underlying	drug	treatments.	In	the	coming	pages,	my	aim	is	to	show	how	these	







	 Two	 types	of	problematic	prescribing	practices	 -overprescription	and	concomitant	
prescription	of	psychotropic	drugs-	will	be	addressed.	To	illustrate	these,	I	will	focus	on	two	
areas	of	office-based	practice:	first,	the	management	of	depression	by	GPs	and	second,	that	
of	 autism	 by	 psychiatrists.	 Indeed,	 these	 two	 poles	 of	 observation	 offer	 an	 interesting	
contrast	that	is	useful	for	thinking	through	the	issues	surrounding	the	prescribing	practices	
of	 psychotropic	 drugs.	 However,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 mention	 that	 both	 these	 instances	












However,	 the	 publication	 of	 DSM-III	 in	 1980	marked	 a	 significant	 shift	 in	mental	
disorders	classification.	It	officially	abandons	the	psychoanalytic	and	dimensional	approach	
of	 DSM-II,	 as	 its	 Freudian	 undertones	 were	 considered	 to	 be	 too	 focused	 on	 patients’	
specifics	 and	 lacking	 in	 diagnosis	 precision.	 This	 considerable	 epistemological	 departure	
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was	aimed	at	standardization	and	as	an	attempt	to	narrow	the	gap	between	psychiatry	and	




psychiatry	 away	 from	 the	 fluid	 psychoanalytic	 understanding	 of	 mental	
illness	 toward	 a	 standardized	 nosology	 of	 fixed	 disease	 categories.	 They	




Yet,	 mental	 disorders—because	 of	 their	 intangibility,	 their	 resistance	 to	 being	
reduced	to	“natural”	categories	or	biological	markers—cannot	be	assimilated	to	other	kinds	
of	disease.	Indeed,	a	whole	section	of	psychiatric	literature	attempts	to	deal	with	the	tricky	
issue	 of	 false	 positives	 (diagnoses	 attributed	without	 a	 clinical	 basis)	 and	 false	 negatives	





categories	 in	 day-to-day	 practice.	 After	 the	 introduction	 of	 DSM	 III	 in	 clinical	 practice,	





categories	 and	 resistance	 to	 imposed	 standards	 by	 insurance	 companies,	 government	
services	or	hospital	administrations	that	request	an	immediate	diagnosis	regardless	of	the	
situation	 before	 allowing	 any	 treatment	 to	 start.	 In	 fact,	 clinicians	might	 give	 voluntarily	
vague	diagnosis	on	a	first-base	only	to	provide	them	with	time	for	tentative	–trial-and-error	
treatments.	 Brown	 suggests,	 in	 sum,	 that	 various	 situational	 pressures	 (whether	













The	 diagnosis	of	 depression	 and	 the	 prescription	of	 antidepressants	have	 been	 on	
the	 rise	 since	 the	 last	 two	 decades,	 despite	 practice	 guidelines	 limiting	 the	 clinical	
applications	 for	 these	 drugs	 (Dickinson	 et	 al.,	 2010;	 Macdonald	 et	 al.,	 2005).	 The	 vast	
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majority	 of	 patients	 diagnosed	 with	 depression	 are	 managed	 through	 the	 office-based	
practices	of	primary	care	physicians.	While	a	significant	number	of	recent	publications	have	




	 Mental	 suffering	 or	 emotional	 distress,	 which	 is	 often	 the	 chief	 motivation	 for	
prescribing	 antidepressants	 corresponds	 in	 reality	 to	 an	 “entité	 sans	 clinique”	 (literally	
translated	as	a	non-clinical	entity),	meaning	that	it	is	not	articulated	in	terms	of	a	process	of	
clinical	 reasoning	 (Haxaire,	2006).	 Instead,	 this	 rather	vague	category	 is	 identified	on	 the	
basis	 of	 various	 considerations	 relating	 to	 a	 patient’s	 social	 situation	 and	 conditions	 of	
existence.		
	
Indeed,	 the	 majority	 of	 studies	 that	 have	 examined	 the	 reasoning	 behind	 the	






in	 general	 practice	 is	 how	many	 of	 them	 are	 simply	 sad	 people,	with	 sad	





dis-ease.	 Confronted	 with	 this	 “entité	 sans	 clinique”,	 GPs	 rely	 on	 their	 knowledge	 of	 the	
patients	(their	personal	history	and	their	social	and	professional	backgrounds)	but	also	on	
their	 own	 experience	 and	 gut	 feelings	 to	 assess	 the	 severity	 of	 depression	 symptoms	
(Mercier	et	al.,	2011;	Mitchell	et	al.,	2009;	Hyde	et	al.,	2005).	Thus,	there	are	many	critiques	
of	guidelines	criteria,	evaluation	scales	and	recommendations,	as	those	are	perceived	to	be	
of	 little	 use	 in	 the	 clinical	 decision-making	 process	 leading	 to	 the	 prescribing	 of	
antidepressants	(Mercier	et	al.,	2011;	Mitchell	et	al.,	2009).	Even	though	what	is	seen	as	the	
objective	viewpoint	of	the	DSM	can	be	useful	to	diminish	clinical	or	diagnostic	uncertainty,	
the	 lack	of	a	comprehensive	perspective	becomes	a	major	constraint	 to	 the	application	of	
DSM	categories	and	guideline	recommendations	(Mitchell	et	al.,	2009).	
	
In	most	 of	 the	 studies,	 GPs	 express	 processes	 of	 reasoning	 in	which	 they	 refer	 to	
mental	suffering	as	a	general	disruption	of	individual	equilibrium.	Medications	are	seen	as	a	
panacea	 of	 sorts,	 likely	 to	 aid	 in	 the	 re-establishment	 of	 this	 equilibrium,	 to	 help	 people	
confront	 their	 problems,	 to	 cope	 with	 their	 difficulties:	 «'I	 see	 antidepressants	 ...	 as	 an	
enabler	 which	 is	 something	 very	 important	 -	 and	 enables	 people	 to	 take	 control	 over	
themselves.»	(Hyde	et	al.,	2005:	758).	It	can	be	argued	that	the	propensity	to	prescribe	
antidepressants	 despite	 the	 associated	 uncertainties	 also	 reveals	 a	 «	profession	 of	




ADs	 as	 very	 safe	 (having	 few	 adverse	 effects	 and	 no	 risk	 of	 addiction),	 and	 effective	 in	
treating	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 mental	 health	 conditions,	 which	 gives	 GPs	 a	 sense	 of	 self-	
confidence	(Mitchell	et	al.,	2009;	Hyde	et	al.,	2005:	759):	
	
I	 think	 the	 Prozacs	 of	 this	world	 are	 so	 good	 because	 now	 you've	 got	 the	
license	to	treat	anxiety	and	panic	symptoms.	You	don't	actually	have	to	make	















the	 DSM	 categories	 -	 it	 is	 the	 patient,	 who,	 clearly,	 becomes	 the	 specific	 element	 of	
reasoning.	 However,	 the	 way	 GPs	 intellectually	 construct	 depression	 implicitly	
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acknowledges	 the	 idea	 of	 an	 «entité	 sans	 clinique».	 As	 in	most	 studies	 on	 the	 topic,	 the	
interviewed	 physicians	 tend	 to	 describe	 their	 depressed	 patients	 in	 non-medical	 terms	
(McPherson	&	Armstrong,	2009;	Hyde	et	al.,	2005;	Collin	et	al.,	1999).	Although	attention	is	














adults	 to	autistic	 spectrum	disorders,	ADHD	and	other	disruptive	behavioral	disorders	 in	
children.	(Olfson	et	al.,	2012).	While	antipsychotics	are	considered	as	primary	treatment	for	






24%	 (2007-2008),	while	 antipsychotic	 treatment	 of	 anxiety	 disorders	 in	
adults	and	youths	has	roughly	doubled.		
	
This	 phenomenon	 is	 also	 part	 and	 parcel	 of	 the	 concomitant	 prescribing,	 or	
polypharmacy,	 trend	 in	 office-based	 psychiatry.	 Polypharmacy	 can	 be	 defined	 as	 the	






A	 growing	 number	 of	 voices	 within	 the	 field	 of	 psychiatry	 are	 denunciating	
concomitant	 prescribing	 or	 polypharmacy,	 particularly	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 antipsychotics:		
«Some	 polypharmacy	 is	 rational	 and	 evidence	 based,	 some	 neither.	 Antipsychotic	
polypharmacy	 remains	 stubbornly	 widespread	 despite	 condemnation	 of	 the	 practice	 by	
numerous	bodies.»(Taylor,	2010	:	41).	
	
Studies	 suggest	 that	 psychiatrists,	 more	 than	 GPs,	 prescribe	 concomitant	
psychotropic	 medications,	 and	 show	 a	 greater	 variation	 in	 their	 prescribing	 practices	








target-symptom	 approach	 (Connor,	 2002).	 This	 latter	 strategy	 targets	 symptoms,	
regardless	of	the	primary	diagnosis.	Prescribing	practices	thus	shift	away	from	a	syndrome-
based	 logic	 to	 one	 that	 considers	 symptoms	 and	 their	magnitude	 (such	 as	 thresholds	 of	
severity	and	cut-off	points).	This	last	paradigm	accounts	for	80%	of	prescriptions	given	to	
children	 and	 teenagers	 (Jensen	 et	 al.,	 1999).	 In	 promoting	 a	 propensity	 for	 concomitant	
prescribing,	 this	 symptom-based	 approach	 in	 some	 ways	 eludes	 the	 classification	 of	
discrete	entities	adopted	by	the	DSM.		
	
Although	 little	 work	 has	 been	 done	 on	 the	 reasoning	 underlying	 concomitant	
prescribing	 and	 complex	 prescribing	 patterns,	 an	 interview	 with	 a	 Montréal-based	
paediatric	psychiatrist	offers	a	window	into	how	links	are	created	between	knowledge	and	
clinical	 experience	 (Chamak,	 2006).	 The	 interview	 reveals	 a	 complex	 and	 ambiguous	
relationship	 to	 medication	 in	 the	 management	 of	 children	 with	 autistic	 disorder,	 a	
relationship	 that	 draws	 on	 scrupulous	 observation	 of	 cases	 in	 a	 way	 that	 is	 somewhat	
reminiscent	of	experimental	rationalism	favoured	by	late-nineteenth	century	physicians.	By	
illustrating,	 to	some	extent,	 a	prescribing	 logic	 that	 is	piecemeal	 and	which	 takes	varying	
forms,	as	well	as	a	stance	of	extreme	relativism	with	respect	to	therapeutic	strategies,	the	











on	 mechanisms	 of	 action	 and/or	 the	 (expected)	 effects	 of	 each	 of	 these	 substances	 on	











combination	 with	 other	 antidepressants	 that	 have	 powerful	 effects	 even	 in	
relatively	 low	 doses.	 Instead	 of	 increasing	 the	 dose	 of	 mirtazapine,	 I	 add	
citalopram	in	very	 low	doses	which	potentiates	 the	effect	of	mirtazapine.	 If	 I	
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don’t	succeed	with	 the	onslaught	of	 antidepressants,	 I	 resort	 to	 tranquilizers	
but	avoid	benzodiazepines.		
	
This	 case-by-case	 evaluation	 and	 subtle	 re-adjustment	 of	 dosage	 levels	 and	
substances,	 is	 somehow	 reminiscent	 of	 observation	 of	 facts	 and	 reliance	 on	 clinical	
experience	 —	 that	 was	 prevalent	 in	 the	 last	 third	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 when	
experimental	rationalism	was	becoming	the	dominant	paradigm.	
	
Although	 alarming	 statistics	 of	 concomitant	 prescription	may	 be	 explained	 by	 fads,	
routine	or	lack	of	knowledge	concerning	drugs,	this	is	not	necessarily	the	case.	It	can	also	be	







Today’s	 psychotropic	 prescribing	 practices	 replay,	 in	 a	 rather	 striking	 way,	 the	
dilemmas	 faced	 by	 general	 medicine	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 as	 well	 as	 its	 oscillation	
between	 specificity	 and	 universalism.	 On	 one	 side,	 we	 have	 the	 issues	 surrounding	 the	
management	 of	 depression	 and,	 on	 the	 other,	 of	 autism.	 The	 first	 involves	 little	 clinical	
reasoning;	 indeed,	 the	problem	is	 to	respond	to	an	“entité	sans	clinique,”	a	global	dis-ease	
that	 seems	 to	 be	more	 akin	 to	 a	 disruption	 of	 individual	 equilibrium,	 than	 to	 a	 discrete	
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practices	are	based	upon	sophisticated	 clinical	 reasoning,	 their	 therapeutic	 strategies	are	
directed	 against	 specific	 symptoms	 and	 not	 against	 mental	 illnesses	 as	 discrete	 entities.	
Their	style	of	reasoning	evokes	the	experimental	rationalism	of	the	late	nineteenth	century,	




course	 of	 disease.	 The	 emphasis	 here	 needs	 to	 be	 placed	on	 the	 distinction	 between	 two	
styles	of	reasoning	and	not	between	GPs	and	psychiatrists’	practices.				
	
It	 is	 therefore	 interesting	 to	 note	 that,	 today,	 voices	 in	 psychiatry	 and	 general	
medicine	 are	 making	 themselves	 heard	 denunciating	 the	 failings	 of	 contemporary	
nosography	 regarding	 the	appropriate	management	of	mental	health	problems.	From	 the	
standpoint	 of	 GPs	 who	 must	 manage	 depression,	 we	 note	 that	 despite	 meta-analyses	
showing	little	difference	in	efficacy	when	ADs	are	compared	to	placebo,	prescription	of	ADs	
is	 still	 on	 the	 rise	 (Moscrop,	 2012;	 Middleton	 and	 Moncrieff,	 2011).	 According	 to	 these	
voices,	 this	 phenomenon	 is	 more	 likely	 attributed	 to	 the	 inadequacies	 of	 the	 diagnostic	
framework	 imposed	 by	 the	 DSM	 than	 to	 the	 GP’s	 lack	 of	 knowledge.	 They	 insist	 on	 the	
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necessity	 of	 a	 comprehensive	 approach,	 a	 diagnostic	 framework	 that	 articulates	 the	 bio-
psycho-social	dimensions	and	places	at	 the	 centre	of	 reasoning	and	 therapeutic	practices	




on	 the	 observation	 that	 there	 is	 a	 rise	 in	 concomitant	 prescribing	 practices,	 which	 goes	
against	evidence-based	recommendations	(Bracken	et	 al.,	2012).	According	to	this	critical	






fully	 grasped	 with	 the	 same	 sort	 of	 scientific	 tools	 that	 we	 use	 to	
investigate	 problems	with	 our	 livers	 and	 lungs.	 In	more	 recent	 decades,	
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1 DSM (Diagnostic Statistical Manual) is the American Psychiatric Association’s classification of mental diseases. 
2	The	historical	section	of	this	paper	is	based	on	my	research	concerning		the	prescribing	practices	of	
physicians	and	the	spread	of	scientific	innovation	pertaining	to	pharmaceutical	therapy	in	Montreal,	1869-
1907,	funded	by	the	Conseil	de	recherche	en	sciences	humaines	du	Canada	and	by	the	Hannah	Institute	for	the	
History	of	Medicine	(1997-2000).	
	
3	Exceptions	here	are	quinine	and	mercury,	widely	used	as	specifics	in	the	treatment	of	fevers	(quinine)	and	
of	syphilis	(mercury).		
	
